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Trends
Extraterritorial Application of United States
Economic Laws: Britain Draws the Line
Some observers believe they have sighted signals of a trend toward greater
ethnocentricity in the United States, at least in the sense of a return to a policy
of national economic self-sufficiency and independence. Discussing, and dis-
counting, these signals, Professor Detlev F. Vagts of Harvard Law School
notes in a recent article that:
The endeavor of U.S. authorities to extend the reach of American legal rules
indicates a recognition by the United States of the impact of overseas events. How-
ever, this ethnocentric effort threatens to override or supplant foreign rules with
more familiar American precepts. At times, it has an acute tendency to place the
United States on a collision course with other nations jealous of their sovereign
prerogatives or hostile to American policy. Moreover, the pejorative connotations
attached to the word extraterritorial are indicative of the ease with which an interna-
tional issue may be created.'
Such an issue has arisen in respect to the application of American economic
laws to British individuals and firms who or which are not doing business in
the United States but whose conduct affects American commerce. It may be
overstating matters to describe jurisdictional relations between the two coun-
tries as being on a collision course, but tempers are clearly becoming frayed,
particularly on the British side, and not without reason.
Some background to the present state of affairs may help place it in per-
spective. The attitude of American courts on the general question of extrater-
ritorial application of American economic laws finds much of its origin and
development in antitrust cases. The first foreign commerce antitrust case to
reach the Supreme Court was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,2
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decided in 1909. The Court, per Justice Holmes, adopted a restrictive in-
terpretation of the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff, an
American corporation, alleged that defendant, also an American corpora-
tion, had monopolized and restrained the banana trade between Central
America and the United States. The acts and contracts complained of took
place solely in Central America and included substantial involvement by the
Costa Rican government. The Supreme Court held that the complaint did not
state a cause of action, construing the Sherman Act as not applicable to acts
occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, at least
where they were not wrongful in the nation where they were committed. In
often-quoted dictum Justice Holmes said:
The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done .... For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did
the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority
of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state con-
cerned justly might resent.
The foregoing consideration would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any
statute as confined in its operations and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power. 'All legislation is prima facie territo-
rial.'"
But in 1913, the Court modified its American Banana holding in United
States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co.,4 in which it sustained an
indictment alleging a conspiracy between an American corporation and for-
eign corporations to restrain and monopolize steamship and rail transporta-
tion between United States ports and Canada and Alaska. The Court indi-
cated that to deny jurisdiction would be to put the transportation routes
beyond the control of either the United States or Canada. Four years later,
the Court held in Thomson v. Cayser' that a combination formed in a foreign
country between a group of steamship lines operating between the United
States and South Africa was within the reach of the Sherman act because "the
combination affected the foreign commerce of this country and was put into
operation here." A decade later, the Court in United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp.6 affirmed an injunction under the Sherman Act and section 73 of the
Wilson Tariff Act against a conspiracy entered into in the United States
between American banks and corporations and a Mexican firm to monopo-
lize import trade in sisal, a Mexican plant used to make binder twine. Most of
the acts took place outside the United States. In upholding the jurisdictional
reach of the antitrust laws, the Court, per Justice Reynolds, distinguished the
case from American Banana on the grounds that the conspiracy was entered
1213 U.S. at 356.
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into in the United States, that acts took place in the United States and that
there were effects within the United States.7
The growing emphasis on effects within the United States culminated in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),' which for all practical
purposes put an end to American Banana's reign as authority on the jurisdic-
tional issue. One of the issues in Alcoa was whether the Sherman Act applied
to a contract to establish export quotas made in Switzerland between foreign
corporations. Recognizing that the strong public policy embedded in the anti-
trust laws would be undermined if extraterritorial jurisdiction were denied,9
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, per Judge Learned Hand, ut-
tered the dictum which has since become both shorthand for, and verbal
symbol of, judicial rationalization of the extraterritorial application of
American economic laws, viz:
[Any slate may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends. . .. 'I
As developed, Judge Hand's test is essentially one of whether the conduct has
"intended and actual" or "substantial and foreseeable" effects within the
state which is asserting its jurisdiction.''
The "effects test" has proven to be controversial, not least because it fails
to take into account the possibility, indeed near certainty, that it could lead to
a vast overlap of national assertions of jurisdiction based, on the one hand,
upon the territorial sovereignty to which Justice Holmes referred, and, on the
other hand, the impact territoriality which the effects test itself champions. I2
That overlap was not long in manifesting itself. In 1951, just a few years
after Alcoa, a federal district court in New York applied the antitrust laws
'The foregoing summary of early cases involving extraterritorial application of the antitrust
laws is from S.C. OPPENHEIM & G.E. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: CASES AND COM-
MENTS 783-86 (3d ed. 1968).
-148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
'See also Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Socite'Anonyme de Grance, 451 F.2d 727 (2d Cir.
1971).
01148 F.2d at 443.
'Id. at 443-44; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,285-89(1952); Continental Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-705 (1962).
"A.D. NEALE, a British civil servant, observes in his treatise, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 363 n.l (2d ed. 1970) that:
To be fair to Judge Hand, it should be noted that he qualified his proposition by important
addenda which his critics do not always acknowledge. He noted that some agreements made
outside the United States might actually affect American commerce, though not intended so to
do. Because of the 'international complications likely to arise from an effort in this country to
treat such agreements as unlawful', he thought that Congress could not have intended the
Sherman Act to cover them. Also there might be agreements which, though intended to affect
American imports, did not actually do so; and he was prepared to assume that these should not
be covered. Thus he applied his rule only to agreements which were both intended to affect
American commerce and shown actually to have had some effect. In practice this qualification
might keel) the situations covered by Judge Hand's view of American jurisdiction within
relatively modest bounds. But even the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign activities abroad
which purposely affect American imports clearly conflicts with the principle that a nation's
laws should have sway only within its own territories.
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extraterritorially to a British company which conspired with others to divide
world markets. 3 ,"[T]he law is crystal clear," the court said. "A conspiracy
to divide territories, which affects American commerce, violates the Sherman
Act.' 4 If one were to point to a specific time when British attitudes on the
extraterritoriality issue hardened, it could well be as far back as this case.5
And hardened they have, unfortunately both in the sense of becoming less
conciliatory and in the sense of becoming somewhat oblivious to consider-
able evidence that some American courts and regulatory authorities have
made concessions unilaterally that go far in meeting the most urgent British
demands. In both senses of the word, the attitude of the British establishment
is illustrated by the remarks of John Nott, Secretary of Trade, at a press
conference held October 31, 1979 to announce the introduction into the
House of Commons of legislation aimed at countering what the British per-
ceive as a continuing encroachment by United States regulatory authorities
on British sovereignty.
The Protection of Trading Interests Bill ... will strengthen, in a variety of ways,
our defenses against U.S. practices which are not only widely regarded as unaccept-
able internationally but are having a most damaging effect on the commercial ac-
tivities of British companies.
It is one thing for a firm to be expected to abide by the laws of an overseas country
whilst it is doing business in that country. It is quite another thing to be expected to
abide by the laws of that country, to accept the judgment of its courts or the require-
ments of its authorities, when operating elsewhere.
• ..The time is right for legislation on two counts. First, there are two large treble
damage antitrust cases currently going on in the U.S. that could result in enormous
financial penalties to several companies in the U.K. Second, more generally, the
tide of opinion in the U.S. appears to be running strongly in favour of the applica-
tion of their economic policies outside their territorial jurisdiction. We must be
ready to respond.'1
I will return to the two treble damage suits in a moment. The larger issue,
however, is the "tide of opinion" in the United States which Mr. Nott identi-
fies as strongly ethnocentric. The reference is not just to antitrust law, one
should note, it applies as well to trends which appear to the British to charac-
terize enforcement of American securities, commodity and futures trading
and banking laws and regulations.' 7
'United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504(S.D.N.Y. 1951 ),final
decree issued 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
'100 F. Supp. 592.
"See, e.g., British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All
E.R. 780 (C.A.).
"Department of Trade, Press Notice ("Protection of Trading Interests Bill - Statement by
John Nott"), 31 October 1979, Ref. 452, at 1-2. See generally Hacking, The Increasing Extrater-
ritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, I Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 1 (1979); and Gordon, Trends, 13 INT'L LAW. 371, 373-77 (1979).
"Such matters as attempts, or perceived threats of attempts, to impose disclosure require-
ments on British firms, or to force British subsidiaries of United States firms to obey American
legal policy in dealing with the Arab boycott of companies that trade with Israel, or to oblige
London branches of United States banks to comply with American banking laws and regula-
tions, are mentioned in newspaper accounts accompanying the proposed Bill. See, e.g. Interna-
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With respect to banking laws and regulations, comment must await devel-
opments occasioned by the situation in Iran. But it is not too early to suggest
that British perceptions about the trend in American antitrust and securities
law enforcement do not appear to be fully supported by actual judicial and
administrative events.
In the securities field, for example, a stream of underpublicized rulings
from the influential Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has established
what seems to be a presumption against its possession of subject matter juris-
diction in suits whose subject matter is predominantly foreign. The most
recent example is to be found in the court's affirmation of a judgment dis-
missing an action brought under the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.8 by foreign financial underwriters against a Swiss
computer sales company. Plaintiffs in Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Interna-
tionale Pour L 'Informatique Cl I Honeywell Bull'9 alleged a fraud and con-
spiracy of worldwide proportions involving events and parties in at least six
countries, including the United States. In its decision, the Second Circuit
traced its developing policy in cases involving "predominantly foreign" sub-
ject matter and concluded that such disputes are "rightfully resolved in the
courts of another land." 2
From 1971 to 1975, plaintiffs (a Swiss resident of German nationality,
along with Swiss and Bahamian companies his family controlled) helped un-
derwrite the private placement of a series of promissory notes issued by a
Swiss computer sales company (defendant HBS). The notes proved to have
been fraudulently prepared by HBS's chief financial officer, who apparently
invested the proceeds of their sale in a Canadian natural gas exploration
company. When that company went bankrupt, the bulk of the proceeds was
lost. When HBS denied responsibility and declined to honor the notes as they
fell due, suits were instituted in the United States and Switzerland.
Some of the notes had been placed with a New York corporation which had
resold them to other financial institutions. However, none of the purchasers
was a party in the Fidenas case, a fact noted by the Second Circuit which
declined to consider whether subject matter jurisdiction might lie if an
American purchaser of the notes had brought suit in a federal court, or if a
class or derivative action had been brought in which the group represented
included American "victims," or if the SEC had initiated enforcement pro-
ceedings.
Plaintiffs alleged that they had lost their principal American customer and,
at least in their estimation, had begun to suffer the consequences of a reputa-
tion tarnished by involvement with the sale of the HBS notes. They also
alleged fraudulent activity in the United States, including a cover-up by
tional Herald Tribune, Nov. 1, 1979, at 7; N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1979, at D 11; N.Y. Times,
Dec. 1, 1979, at 27; Financial Times, Nov. I, 1979, at 9.
'115 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1971).
'[19791 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,947 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 1979).
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HBS's American parent company. However, these activities apparently did
not involve defendants. In any event, the Second Circuit regarded as conclu-
sory plaintiff's allegations that they were fraudulent. Whatever further dis-
covery in the case might show to have been the scope of the activity within the
United States, the court said, the essential core of the alleged fraud took place
in Switzerland; any activities in the United States were clearly secondary and
ancillary and did not meet the tests which the Second Circuit, in earlier cases,
had established for determining subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving
the extraterritorial reach of the 1934 Act.
The Act itself is of little help to anyone concerned with how far its territo-
rial reach is meant to extend. The only provision on point, the Second Circuit
said, says merely that the Act's provisions do not apply to "any person inso-
far as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this [statute]." 2' No
rules have been promulgated by the SEC elaborating upon this provision.
Lacking statutory guidance, the Second Circuit over the past decade has
taken to outlining for itself the general contours of subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the federal securities laws. In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook" the
court said Congress intended the 1934 Act to have extraterritorial application
in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities
on American exchanges, and to protect the domestic securities market from
the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities. Thus, it
concluded that subject matter jurisdiction may lie in cases involving viola-
tions which take place outside the United States, when the transactions in-
volve stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange and are
detrimental to the interests of American investors. 23
But in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 2 the Second
Circuit cautioned that the 1934 Act's antifraud provision is much too incon-
clusive for the court to infer a Congressional intent to impose rules governing
conduct throughout the world in every instance where an American company
has bought or sold a security. More recently, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 21 it said that "when. . .a court is confronted with transactions that on
any view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether Con-
gress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and
law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the prob-
lem to foreign countries." Having this in mind, the court held that the 1934
Act's antifraud provisions:
215 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976) (originally enacted as § 30(b) of the 1934 Act).
22405 F.2d 200,206 (2d Cir.), aff'din relevantpart, 405 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
11405 F.2d at 208.
24468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
"519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
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(1) apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the United
States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance oc-
curred in this country; and
(2) apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if, but
only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the United States
have significantly contributed thereto; but
(3) do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United
Stats unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States directly caused
such losses.
26
In HTv. Vencap, Ltd.,27 handed down the same day as Bersch, the Second
Circuit considered the question of subject matter jurisdiction in the context
of a case in which a foreign plaintiff had purchased securities having an
American connection. It held that the effects of the transaction in this coun-
try were not substantial enough to justify subject matter jurisdiction, but it
left open the possibility of jurisdiction based on certain American conduct
under the theory that Congress did not intend "to allow the United States to
be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export,
even when these are peddled only to foreigners." 28 At the same time, it
warned that the basis of jurisdiction is limited "to the perpetuation of
fraudulent acts themselves and does not extend to mere preparatory activities
or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was
performed in foreign countries." 9 "Admittedly," it conceded, "the distinc-
tion is a fine one. But . . .the line has to be drawn somewhere if the securities
laws are not to apply in every instance where something has happened in the
United States, however large the gap between the something and a consum-
mated fraud and however negligible the effect in the United States or on its
citizens. ''0
In the Fidenas case, the court said the transactions alleged were on any view
predominantly foreign, "and we would be no less than astonished were we to
learn that 'Congress would have wished the precious resources of United
States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted' to a case of this
nature. Fraud there might have been, and plaintiffs may very well have been
damaged by its perpetuation. But the dispute here presented is rightfully
resolved in the courts of another land." 3'
More generally, extraterritorial application of United States economic
laws has also been restricted in recent years by refinements in the concept of
due process, especially its implications for in personam and in rem jurisdic-
tion over foreign defendants. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 3 2 the
Supreme Court held that the existence of at least "minimum contacts" be-
z"519 F.2d at 993.
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tween the defendant and the forum are necessary to sustain a court's in per-
sonam jurisdiction against a challenge to its conformity to the Constitution's
due process requirement. More recently, in Shaffer v. Heitner, 11 the court has
extended that notion to quasi in rem jurisdiction by holding that as a matter
of due process some nexus must be shown to exist between property which is
the basis of jurisdiction and the cause of action itself.14
Perhaps even more important, especially in terms of their effect on asser-
tions of the extraterritorial reach of American antitrust laws, have been
several recent judicial pronouncements suggesting that American courts are
becoming more sensitive to the limits which international law and comity
impose on national regulatory competence.3" One thinks especially of the
development by the Ninth Circuit, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,36 and more recently the Third Circuit, in Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corporation," of an approach to jurisdictional questions
characterized by a conflicts-like balancing of the policy interests represented
by the Sherman Act, on the one hand, and those represented by consider-
ations of international comity, on the other. In effect, these decisions rein-
state Justice Holmes's dictum, supra, if not quite his holding, on jurisdiction.
The Justice Department, for its part, now acknowledges that consider-
ations of comity should be weighed in any determination of whether United
States antitrust laws should be applied to overseas conduct. Its Antitrust
Guide for International Operations, issued in 1977, observes that any such
application "should avoid unnecessary interference with the sovereign in-
terests of foreign nations."3 " Similar, indeed even more pointed, policy pro-
nouncements were made contemporaneously with the issuance of the Guide
by leading Justice Department officials.39 In a paper delivered last September
at a conference held at the University of North Carolina School of Law,4"
Joel Davidow, Director of the Antitrust Division's Office of Policy Plan-
ning, gave a few illustrations of how the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman
Act permissible under Judge Hand's formula is limited by considerations of
comity. Assume, he said, that two rival American firms each discover a sup-
ply of a rare metal in Antarctica needed primarily in the United States, and
"433 U.S. 186 (1977).
14The precise scope of Shaffer is still being developed in recent cases. See, e.g., Marketing
Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co.. 457 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); and Amoco Overseas
Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Alge'rienne de Navigation, 459 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"See Gordon, Trends, 13 INT'i. LAW 371, 373-377 (1979).
6549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
'595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
"ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'r o JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAI. OVER A -
TIONS (1977), reprinted in 11977-78 Extra Edition] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), No. 266, t 6-7.
"E.g., Address by Michael J. Egan, Associate Attorney General, before the International Bar
Association, Business Law Section, November 3, 1977; address by Griffin B. Bell, Attorney
General of the United States, before the American Bar Association, August 8, 1977.
"Davidow, U.S. Antitrust and Doing Business Abroad: Recent Trends and Developments,
paper delivered at Conference on Antitrust Aspects of International Terrorism, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina, September 28, 1979 [hereinafter Davidow].
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then conspire to sell it to American buyers at secretly fixed prices. "Applica-
tion of the Sherman Act to this scheme would probably be held not to involve
any jurisdictional, international law, comity or balancing considerations,
simply because there are no conflicting factors to balance," Mr. Davidow
observed." But assume that a challenge to a rationalization cartel among two
German firms in Germany which cartel was legal in Germany in regard to a
range of products sold worldwide only 2 percent of which reach the United
States. "In those circumstances, assertion of jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act to punish or prevent the arrangement would undoubtedly raise jurisdic-
tional, international and political issues. The new comity-balancing test...
would probably lead to dismissal on the grounds that the United States'
minor contacts with and interest in the transaction is outweighed by
Germany's contacts and interests.""
The Justice Department's practice appears to confirm the seriousness with
which it views the importance of comity, at the same time providing an exam-
ple of the domestic political consequences which can result from its doing so.
According to accounts appearing in the New York Times just a few weeks
ago,43 in April, 1978, the Department rejected a staff recommendation to
indict a number of companies, mostly foreign, on felony antitrust charges
growing out of their involvement in a foreign uranium cartel." To be sure,
successful prosecution of the charges might not have been easy, since, for one
thing, although the world price of uranium increased dramatically during the
period under investigation, the impact of the operation of the cartel itself
may not be easy to gauge because the world price of oil, an alternative fuel,
was increasingly rapidly during the same period. Moreover, the cartel ap-
parently sought to avoid sales to the United States in order to steer clear of
American antitrust laws, thus further clouding the impact of its activities on
American consumers.4 Finally, the Times' account suggests that the Justice
and State Departments, and the Central Intelligence Agency, were aware of
an arrangement to increase uranium prices worldwide before the group of
uranium mining companies held its first meeting.4 If so, and if it could be
shown that the arrangement had at least tacit support from one or another
arm of the executive branch, the Justice Department's prosecution of the case
might well have been further complicated.
"Id. at 3.
-2Id.
"See N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1979, at 1; id., Dec. 8, 1979, at 31.
"The New York Times reported that the Department ended its investigation when one of the
companies, Gulf Oil Corporation, pleaded no contest to a single misdemeanor involving price
fixing. The Times's account quoted the staff recommendation as saying that starting in early
1972 and continuing up to at least the fall of 1975 each of the named companies was a participant
in "a highly organized conspiracy which had as its expressed purpose stabilizing and increasing
the price of uranium and which was intended to and did in fact substantially and adversely
impact on U.S. interstate and foreign commerce." N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1979, at D II.
"The Times's account, however, cites an internal Justice Department memorandum to the
effect that some American utilities had purchased uranium for future delivery from the cartel
members and had to pay higher prices as a direct result of the cartel's activities. Id. There is also
the matter of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's civil suit, infra.
"Id. at I.
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However, diplomatic implications, rather than problems of prosecution,
appear to have been principally responsible for the Justice Department's
decision not to prosecute. The Times quotes the memorandum containing the
staff recommendation in favor of prosecuting as saying the staff had "no
misapprehension as to the consequences of our bringing this case: there will
be a diplomatic furor with the countries affected." 4 "Consequently," the
memorandum was quoted as saying, "we believe that it is appropriate as a
matter of comity and prosecutional discretion to limit our choice of defen-
dants."" 8
The investigation of the cartel's activities was hampered in a number of
countries whose nationals allegedly took part in the cartel by laws which are
designed to keep documents there from being used in furtherance of Ameri-
can antitrust (and, for that matter, securities laws) actions. 9 In fact, it is
often with respect to questions of jurisdiction over information that the in-
ternational battle over the Sherman Act's applicability to foreign defendants
and conduct is waged, sometimes on the further grounds that the information
is confidential, or involves matters of state. In his North Carolina speech,
Mr. Davidow conceded that "it is now fairly well settled that a rigid foreign
prohibition against removing information provides a defense against a
charge of contempt of a subpoena in an American investigation or case. ' ' 0
He then added (more pointedly than his audience could have realized) that
"greater efforts are being made to solve these issues diplomatically by in-
forming relevant foreign governments early, employing voluntary requests
when possible, and clarifying safeguards for ensuring the confidentiality of
sensitive material which is produced." 5 '
"Id. at D 11. The British and Canadian governments were said to have been particularly
sensitive to the prospect of prosecution of their nationals by the United States Government in
respect of acts committed outside the United States. Id. The Financial Times reported recently
that since 1945 at least nineteen governments have protested to the United States about its
assertion of jurisdiction in international antitrust cases. See Cheeseright, Donne, Hargreaves &
Hermann, Overseas Backlash Against Antitrust Laws: Pushing Back the Boundary of U.S.
Jurisdiction, Financial Times, Nov. 3, 1979, at 11. [hereinafter cited as Cheeseright, et al.]
"N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1979, at D 11.
"In one of the private actions related to the activities of the cartel, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation sought to obtain testimony concerning it in London, causing Lord Denning to note
that efforts by Westinghouse to obtain evidence showing the existence of the conspiracy had
failed in Australia, Canada, France and South Africa. "We are told," he said, "that in those
countries regulations have been passed so as to forbid the documents of the cartel being dis-
closed." In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No.
232, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, 434 (C.A.), as quoted in Mehrighe, The Westinghouse Uranium Case:
Problems Encountered in Seeking Foreign Discovery and Evidence, 13 INT'L LAW. 19, 22(1979).
See also Carter, Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidence for Use in Litigation in the United
States: Existing Rules and Procedures, id. at 5, 7.
"Davidow, at 8, citing Socit Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); and In re Wes-
tinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
"Davidow, at 8, citing In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litiga-
tion, supra, note 49; and Federal Maritime Commission v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). Butsee In re Grand Jury Subpoena (United States v. Field), 532 F.2d 404, reh.
denied, 535 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). Supra note 40. Mr. Nott noted
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However, as Mr. Davidow noted, "the major single activity of the Anti-
trust Division is not prosecution but investigation." 2 During the past five
years, the Antitrust Division has expanded its Foreign Commerce section
from seven lawyers to (as of the time of Mr. Davidow's remarks) twenty-two,
"with a more than corresponding increase in active investigation." 53 More-
over, sections dealing with energy and transportation also investigate foreign
developments in those fields, apparently with particular emphasis on the role
of the leading international petroleum companies in the world oil market. 4
Mr. Davidow observed that:
The [Antitrust] Division's investigations may seek documents or interviews in for-
eign countries when doing so seems necessary and feasible, and in accord with the
law of the other nations. In order to avoid diplomatic incidents in that regard, a
regular practice of informing affected governments of such investigations has been
instituted, and is operating quite satisfactorily. 5
Not so satisfactorily to the British, judging by legislation, entitled the Pro-
tection of Trading Interests Act 1979 (Act),56 introduced by the British gov-
ernment into the House of Commons on November 15, 1979. According to
the Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the bill, the Act has six
substantive provisions. Clause 1 provides a number of means by which the
British government may counter measures which are taken or proposed to be
taken by or under the laws of a foreign country for regulating or controlling
international trade, and which are or would be damaging to the trading in-
terests of the United Kingdom. 7 First, it authorizes the Secretary of State to
issue orders specifying the measures concerned. Second, it authorizes him to
make further orders requiring persons in the United Kingdom who carry on
business in the foreign country to notify him of any requirements or prohibi-
tions imposed or threatened to be imposed on them under such measures,
including any requirement to submit any contract or other document for
approval thereunder." Third, he is authorized to prohibit compliance with
such measures.
in his London press conference a few weeks later that "We have tried over the years to deal with a






"The Act supersedes and repeals the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act
1964, together with amendments to it which appear in paragraph 18 of Schedule 2 and paragraph
24 of Schedule 3 to the Criminal Law Act of 1977.
"The test is simply that "it appears to the Secretary of State ... that those measures, in so far
as they apply or would apply to things done or to be done outside the territorial jurisdiction of
[the foreign] country by persons catrying on business in the United Kingdom, are damaging or
threaten to damage the trading interests of the United Kingdom." Act, § I(l)(b).
"It may be recalled that the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act requires that prior to any
merger or acquisition of substantial size detailed information regarding the products and
markets of both firms must be submitted to the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division. 90 Stat. 1390, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1976). International mergers
are subject to these requirements. Mr. Davidow noted that "care has been taken to avoid asking
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Clause 2 provides that where a person in the United Kingdom has been or
may be required to produce to a court, tribunal or authority of another coun-
try commercial documents which are "not within the territorial jurisdiction
of" that country, or where commercial information may be compelled from
them, the Secretary of State may give directions prohibiting compliance with
that requirement.59 The test for applying this provision is that it appears to
the Secretary that the foreign requirement "infringes the jurisdiction of the
United Kingdom or is otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom" 6 or that "compliance. . .would be prejudicial to the security of
the United Kingdom or to the relation of the government of the United
Kingdom with the government of any other country." 6
Clause 3 imposes penalties for failure to comply with the requirements in
the first two clauses. Up to this point, the Act does not appear to differ too
markedly from similar anti-antitrust legislation enacted in other countries.
Clause 4 is somewhat unique to the United Kingdom, in that it provides that
in proceedings under the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
1975 British courts shall not comply with a request made by a foreign court
when the Secretary of State has given a certificate that the request infringes
United Kingdom jurisdiction or is otherwise prejudicial to the United
Kingdom. This appears merely to codify the decision reached by the Law
Lords in the suit successfully brought by Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation against
Westinghouse Electric Corporation to block the latter's attempt to obtain
testimony in Britain for use in litigation in the United States concerning the
uranium cartel, supra. 62
However, the last two clauses of the Act are unique and indicate how
intense feelings in Britain have become on the extraterritoriality issue. Clause
5 provides that judgments for multiple damages given in civil proceedings by
courts of overseas countries shall not be enforceable. in the United
Kingdom; 63 further, that judgments given in overseas countries based on
competition laws which have been specified by an order made by the Secre-
tary of State shall not be enforceable in the United Kingdom.6" Clause 6
for burdensome information unrelated to operations in or directed toward the U.S." Davidow at
6-7, citing 16 C.F.R. § 802.50-802.52 (1979).
"Act § 2(l)(a). Section 2(3) adds that a requirement of the sort referred to in § 2(l)(a) "is also
inadmissible-(a) if it is made otherwise than for the purposes of civil or criminal proceedings
which have been instituted in the overseas country or of civil proceedings whose institution in
that country is contemplated; or (b) if it is made wholly or mainly for the purpose of obtaining
discovery of documents before the trial of any such proceedings."
"Act § 2(2)(a).
'Id. § 2(2)(b).
"See note 49, supra.
6"Act § 5(1). ("[N]o court in the United Kingdom shall entertain proceedings at common law
for the recovery of any sum payable under such a judgment.")
"4Act § 5(2)(b). The order to which this refers is one made by the Secretary of State "in respect
of any provision of rule of law which appears to him to be concerned with the prohibition or
regulation of agreements, arrangements or practices designed to restrain or restrict competition
in the carrying on of business of any description or to be otherwise concerned with the promotion
of such competition as aforesaid." Id. § 5(4).
Current Legal Developments
enables United Kingdom citizens, United Kingdom corporations and other
persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom to recover from the
party in whose favor a multiple damages award was given "so much of the
damages paid to or obtained by him under the judgment as exceeds the sum
assessed by [the foreign] court as compensation for the loss or damage sus-
tained by him." 65
The idea, as well as the effect, of multiple damages awards is especially
irritating to the British. In his remarks to the press, Mr. Nott described multi-
ple damage awards as "one of the most objectionable of all American legal
devices."66 An article appearing the next day in the Financial Times noted:
"In the U.K. view the treble damages system is nothing more than a lawyer's
ramp.'' 6
7
If so,it is a steep one. "I should perhaps make it clear," Mr. Nott said,
"that we are not talking here of just a few million pounds either way; there
are cases active now, involving British companies, in which billions of
pounds are at stake." 6 The most prominent of these cases, at least to date,
grows out of Westinghouse's alleged failure to honor supply contracts with a
number of American utility companies. Among other defenses, Westing-
house pleaded commercial impracticability, citing supply restricting activi-
ties of the uranium producers' cartel. Westinghouse's potential liability to
the utilities being in the neighborhood of $2 billion, its treble damage suit
against the uranium producers asks for $6 billion, the $2 billion for which it
could be liable multiplied to give a punitive effect.
Another pending case involves allegations of antitrust arrangements in
transatlantic shipping, an area whose politics have frequently been in-
fluenced by antitrust considerations. The Department of Justice is alleging
that seven European and United States shipping groups violated antitrust
laws in arriving at the common tariff structures which are the basis of the
Atlantic shipping conference's pricing system. These shipping groups, which
include a major British company, agreed last June to pay fines totalling about
$6 million, without admitting guilt. 69 Following that, the Federal Maritime
Commission began a full-scale inquiry into the conference's activities and a
number of private damage suits have been initiated by customers of the ship-
ping lines."0 Other transnational industrial groups, even ones enjoying a
6 Id. § 6(1). This provision does not apply where the person against whom the judgment was
given is an individual who was ordinarily resident in the overseas country at the time when the
proceedings in which the judgment was given were instituted or a corporation which had its
principal place of business there at that time. Id. § 6(2). Nor does it apply if the person against
whom the judgment was given carried on business in the overseas country through a branch or
establishment in that country and the proceedings there were concerned with activities exclu-
sively carried on in that country through the branch or establishment. Id. § 6(3).
"Press Notice, supra note 16, at 1.
6Cheeseright, UK Fights Antitrust Laws-Damages System 'a Ramp', Financial Times,
November I, 1979, at 9, col. 6.
'Press Notice, supra note 16, at I.
"See Cheeseright, et al., supra note 47, at 11.
"Id.
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measure of quasi-official international authority because of the support
given to them by national governments and public international organiza-
tions, are said to be concerned with the implications of the transatlantic
shipping industry's antitrust problems."
American regulatory officials are themselves caught in something of a self-
made bind. The Justice Department's decision not to seek an indictment
against the uranium producers' cartel, for example, occasioned severe criti-
cism from the Senate Judiciary Committee in December, 1979, when John H.
Shenefield, who had been serving as Acting Associate Attorney General since
the previous August, was being considered by the Committee for the position
on a permanent basis. While one might assume that the Senate criticism was
launched with a view primarily to domestic politics, even the accounts of the
Department's actions carried by the New York Times, in a front page story,
were tinged with implications of scandal.72 Having created a tradition for
itself of vigorous and independent enforcement of the antitrust laws, the
Justice Department now is apt to be accused of bowing to political pressures
even if it does no more than to yield to the logic of Holmes's dictum, the trend
of recent judicial pronouncements and the dictates of global economic inter-
dependence.
There is clearly a growing burden on Congress to address itself to national
economic policy issues in the global framework such interdependence re-
quires. But Congress does not always seem especially anxious to do so, parti-
cularly where an issue's domestic implications seem more politically immi-
nent than its overseas ones. This aspect of ethnocentricity is perhaps
epitomized by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), " particularly as it
appears to be in the process of being administered by the SEC and the Justice
Department. A hint of what may be forthcoming is offered by a settlement
reached in August 1979 in a suit brought against International Telephone and
Telegraph Company by the SEC under the FCPA in which ITT agreed "to
take reasonable steps" to implement and enforce a previously passed resolu-
tion of its board of directors "requiring the ITTsystem to obey the laws of
the jurisdictions in which it does business, prohibiting corrupt business prac-
tices and directing certain procedures to ensure compliance with the require-
ments and prohibitions of such resolution." 4 Under the terms of the consent
decree, ITT also agrees not to change or deviate from the policies and proce-
dures stated in the resolution without the approval of its board of directors,
prior notice to the SEC, and full disclosure to its stockholders in a current
report.' Agreeing to abide by its own directors' order to carry on its business
"E.g., the Geneva-based International Air Transport Association, which has been clashing
with the Civil Aeronautics Board over the possibility its immunity from American antitrust laws
will be removed. See Cheeseright ef al., supra note 47, at 12.
"N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1979, at I.
715 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I and 78dd-2.




lawfully is surely little more than a self-serving gesture in itself, one might
say, especially inasmuch as the company did not admit any wrongdoing in the
process. But the implications of the judgment and consent are more apparent
when one recognizes that ITT, with its worldwide operations, had implicitly
agreed to assure compliance by the officers of its foreign subsidiaries, albeit
compliance with local, not necessarily American, anticorruption laws.
In seeking to enforce FCPA, the SEC last April proposed rules which
would require companies to file statements indicating whether their systems
of internal accounting control provide "reasonable assurances" that speci-
fied internal accounting objectives are being met.76 The statements would
also have to describe any "material weaknesses" in internal accounting con-
trols which have been communicated to the companies by their independent
accountants, and to state the reasons why these weaknesses have not been
corrected. By September, the SEC had received almost a thousand comments
on the proposed rule, most opposed to it. As Washington attorney Jennifer
A. Sullivan notes in the January, 1980 issue of International Practitioner's
Notebook, "the opposition is based in part on the belief that requiring cor-
porate managers to certify as to compliance with a statutory provision, under
which they may be exposed to a criminal liability, is repugnant to the consti-
tutional privilege against self-incrimination." 7 7 That, together with a recent
holding by a federal district court in New York that "the proxy rules simply
do not require management to accuse itself of antisocial or illegal policies," 78
render the future of the proposed rules in doubt.
Even if the SEC is constrained to tone down the enthusiasm with which it
administers the FCPA, foreign apprehension is not apt to be assuaged so long
as the Justice Department's enforcement of the Act's criminal law provisions
remains uncertain.79 The Department has been establishing a review proce-
dure under which a company may obtain review by the Department's
Criminal Division of a proposed transaction and a ruling by that Division of
its enforcement intentions should the transaction be effectuated." But Ms.
Sullivan notes that the review process already faces difficulties. One is that
the Criminal Division's letter would apply only to parties that join in the
request, leaving open its effect on others. Another is that a review letter from
the Justice Department would not bind other agencies, notably the SEC. A
third is that it does not cover that part of the FCPA which requires the
maintenance of accurate and reasonably detailed books and records and the
"Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15772 (April 30, 1979). See Sullivan, SEC, Justice
Department Proposes Corrupt Practices Act Rules, INT'L PRACT. NOTEBOOK, No. 9 (January
1980).
171d.
"Amalgamated Clothing v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
"The SEC has adopted rules indicating that settlement of an SEC enforcement action does not
extend to possible or pending criminal action. Securities Act Release No. 6111 (Aug. 23, 1979).
"See 28 C.F.R. § 50.17 (1976).
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establishment, supra, of effective internal accounting controls-one of the
broadest provisions in the FCPA.
In a recent speech, Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heyman indicated
that the Justice Department will give high priority to situations, inter alia, in
which a foreign government is making an effort to enforce antibribery poli-
cies; a company has a history of payments to foreign officials; senior
management is involved either actively or passively; the company has been
less than diligent in monitoring employees' activities; or there have been
deliberate or persistent violations of FCPA.' The last three of these are
unlikely to reduce apprehension abroad over the zeal with which FCPA will
be enforced.
There is, therefore, some basis for concluding, as the British appear to
have concluded, that the United States is currently being swept by a tide of
ethnocentric regulatory enthusiasm. But one is disposed to add, especially in
light of recent judicial pronouncements signalling a very different trend, that
the tide may also be no more than one of the many conflicting forces buffet-
ing American social opinion at this juncture in our national history. That
other, especially globally oriented, forces are not so readily apparent to some
observers may be a reflection of a parochial zeal of another kind: the kind
which renders it easier to pay attention to trends which prove one's point than
to ones which undermine it. The present writer, it should be noted, is not
invariably immune from this kind of zeal himself.
"Speech by Philip B. Heymann, Pierre Hotel, New York, New York, November 8, 1979, cited
in Sullivan, supra note 76.
